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Abstract—Hardware Trojans (HTs) have drawn more and
more attention in both academia and industry because of its
significant potential threat. In this paper, we proposed a novel
HT detection method using information entropy based clustering,
named HTDet. The key insight of HTDet is that the Trojan
usually be inserted in the regions with low controllability and
low observability in order to maintain high concealment, which
will result in that Trojan logics appear extremely low transitions
during the simulation. This means that the logical regions with
the low transitions will provide us with much more abundant
and more important information for HT detection. Therefore,
HTDet applies information theory technology and a typical
density-based clustering algorithm called Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) to detect all
suspicious Trojan logics in circuit under detection (CUD). DB-
SCAN is an unsupervised learning algorithm, which can improve
the applicability of HTDet. Besides, we develop a heuristic
test patterns generation method using mutual information to
increase the transitions of suspicious Trojan logics. Experimental
evaluation with benchmarks demenstrates the effectiveness of
HTDet.
Index Terms—HT Detection; Information Entropy; DBSCAN;
Unsupervised learning; Mutual Information; Test Patterns Gen-
eration
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the globalization of modern integrated circuit
(IC) industry has raised more and more hardware security
challenges. For example, intellectual property (IP) cores and
EDA tools provided by the third-party are widely used in
IC design to reduce development cost and to shorten the
marketing cycle [1]. As third-party IP cores are designed by
outsourced vendors, an adversary can easily implement some
malicious logics into IP cores, referred to as Hardware Trojans
(HTs).
HTs are lightweight structures in large-scale IC designs,
which commonly contain two components called Trojan trig-
ger and Trojan payload [2]. Trojan trigger is responsible for
monitoring signals to determine whether the trigger signal has
arrived. If Trojan trigger is not activated, HTs stay dormant
and do not have effect on the original circuit. If Trojan trigger
is activated, Trojan payload will perform specific malicious
operations such as to change functionality, to degrade per-
formance and to reveal secret information [3]. Since most of
Corresponding author: shenhh@ucas.ac.cn; lihuawei@ict.ac.cn
HTs usually have extremely rare trigger conditions, it is very
challenging to detect suspicious Trojan logics in circuit under
detection (CUD).
The existing HTs detection techniques can be roughly
classified into five major groups: reverse engineering [4]–
[6], side channel analysis [7]–[13], static structure analysis
[15]–[20], statistical feature analysis [21]–[25], and functional
testing [26]–[29]. In reverse engineering, a fabricated chip
is completely dissected layer-by-layer in order to reconstruct
the IC design to detect malicious modifications. Reverse
engineering approaches consume prohibitively high cost, and
it is impossible to carry out reverse engineering for each chip
under test. In side-channel analysis, the impacts of HTs on
circuit delay, transient current, leakage power and so on can
be used to detect whether there are the HTs in CUD. Side-
channel analysis approaches can detect HTs inserted in the
post-fabrication stage. However, side-channel analysis usually
requires a “Golden Circuit” for impact comparison and it also
is susceptible to process variations or environmental noise,
which can result in lots of false positives. Like software virus
detection technique, static structure analysis methods perform
HT detection by analyzing circuit structure characteristics.
Though static structure analysis is an effective HT detection
approach, it can only detect known types of HTs. There are
intrinsic differences between Trojan logics and normal circuit,
so statistical feature analysis approaches can be used to detect
potentail HTs in CUD. Functional testing approaches try to
generate test vectors to activate potential HTs and propagate
HTs effects to the primary outputs. Though functional testing
is independent with process variations and environmental
noise, functional testing usually consume significant amount
of time due to the high concealment of HTs.
The key insight of our approach is that Trojans usually
be inserted in the regions with low controllability and low
observability in order to maintain high concealment, which
will result in that Trojan logics appear extremely low tran-
sitions during the simulation. In the field of information
theory, if the event is improbable, it will provide much more
information when the event happens. That is, the logical
regions with the low transitions will provide us with much
more abundant and more important information for Trojan
detection. In this paper, we propose a novel HT detection
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method using information entropy based clustering, named
HTDet. Firstly, the digital stimuli is generated for the CUD.
Then the information entropy of signal sequence of each wire
is calculated, and a typical density-based clustering algorithm
called Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise (DBSCAN) is applied to obtain all suspicious Trojan
logics. Further, a heuristic test patterns generation method us-
ing mutual information is developed to increase the transitions
of these suspicious Trojan logics. In summary, this paper has
the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
to use information entropy technology to detect HTs in
hardware design, and HTDet can achieve good experi-
mental results.
• Unsupervised learning algorithm, DBSCAN, is used for
Trojan detection, which means that HTDet does not
require “Golden Circuit”. Further, HTDet does not require
that the Trojan logic is pushed the triggering state. As
long as the transitions of logical regions are extremely
low, HTDet can detect them based on density-reachable
relationship.
• We develop a heuristic test patterns generation method
using mutual information technology to increase the
transitions of suspicious Trojan logics.
• We carry out lots of evalutaion work on TrustHub bench-
marks [34], which shows that the proposed technique
can detect suspicious Trojan logics with negligible false
positives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and
Section 3 introduces the theoretical basis and the threat model,
respectively. We present proposed HT detection method in
detail in Section 4. Section 5 presents test patterns generation
method for suspicious Trojan logics in detail. Experimental
analysis is presented in Section 6. Section 7 briefly summarize
the related work. Finally, we conclude this paper and in
Section 8.
II. THEORETICAL BASIS
In this paper, we perform the HT detection using infor-
mation theory technology [30]. In this section, we give the
theoretical basis of the proposed approach.
A. Information Entropy
Information Entropy is also known as the self-information,
which is the average rate at which information is produced by
a source of data. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty about
random variable.
Let X be a discrete random variable, and its probability
distribution is consistent with p(x) = P (X = x), where x ∈
X . Hence, the entropy H(X) of X can be explicitly written
as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) logb p(x) (1)
, where b is the base of the logarithm used. In this paper, b is
equal to the mathematical constant e. In the case of p(x) = 0,
the value of 0 logb 0 is taken to be 0, which is consistent with
the limit.
lim
p(x)→0+
p(x) logb p(x) = 0 (2)
B. Joint Entropy
In information theory, joint entropy is a measure of the
uncertainty associated with a set of variables. In this paper,
we focus on the joint entropy of two random variables.
Similarly, let X and Y be two discrete random variables,
and their probability distribution is p(x, y), where x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y . Hence, the joint entropy H(X,Y ) of X Y can be
presented as
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb p(x, y). (3)
C. Conditional Entropy
In information theory, the conditional entropy quantifies the
amount of information needed to describe the outcome of a
random variable Y given the value of another random variable
X is known.
The entropy H(Y |X) of Y conditioned on X can be defined
as following formula.
H(Y |X) =
∑
x∈X
p(x)H(Y |X = x)
=
∑
x∈X
p(x)
−∑
y∈Y
p(y|x) logb p(y|x)

= −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb p(y|x)
(4)
It’s worth noting that H(X), H(X,Y ) and H(Y |X) can
conform the chain rule. That is,
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb p(x, y)
= −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb [p(x)p(y|x)]
= −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) [logb p(x) + logb p(y|x)]
= −
∑
x∈X
p(x) logb p(x)−
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb p(y|x)
= H(X) +H(Y |X)
(5)
D. Mutual Information
The mutual information of two variables is a measure
of the mutual dependence between the two variables. More
specifically, the mutual information quantifies the amount
of information obtained about one random variable through
observing the other random variable.
Let X, Y be two discrete random variables, and their
joint probability distribution is p(x, y). Hence, the mutual
information I(X;Y ) between X and Y can be defined as
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
. (6)
According to the correlation between probability distribu-
tions and the chain rule, I(X;Y ) Can also be expressed as
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) logb
p(x|y)
p(x)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) [logb p(x|y)− logb p(x)]
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(Y,X)
(7)
III. THREAT MODEL
The threat model of proposed method is based on several
assumptions.
• With the globalization of chip design, the adversaries can
have more opportunities to insert HTs into a digital circuit
design than before. It can be gate-level netlist or register
transfer language (RTL).
• Our threat model assumes that the hardware design that
we are given is in the form of digital circuit design.
• The goal of attack is to change functionality, destroy the
IC, and/or leak secret information through logical attack,
rather than through side-channels such as current, power
or electromagnetic.
IV. HTDET METHODOLOGY
In this section, first, we provide the feasibility analysis of
proposed HT detection method. Then the technical details
of HTDet is presented. The core problem is whether the
information entropy technology and clustering algorithm can
be used to detect suspicious Trojan logics in the circuit under
detection (CUD).
A. Feasibility Analysis
The key insight of HTDet is that there is the significant
difference between the Trojan logic and the rest of the circuit.
More specifically, the HT usually be inserted in the logical
regions with low controllability and low observability, which
causes that Trojan logic has a very low transition probability.
Moreover, in the field of information theory [30], if an event
is very probable, the little information was provided when it
happens. Conversely, if the event is improbable, it will provide
much more information when the event happens.
That is, the logical regions with the low transitions will pro-
vide us with more abundant and more important information
for HT detection. However, if we directly apply the transition
probability for Trojan detection, which will result in high false
positives. Fox example, we consider that the signal wires (from
W1 to W14) have the transition probabilities listed in Table 1.
Due to the density-reachable relationship between low tran-
sition probability and high transition probability, signal wires
from W1 to W10 can be reported as suspicious Trojan logic
as shown in Figure 1 (blue line). While the use of information
entropy can significantly reduce false positives. As shown in
Figure 1 (orange line), signal wires from W1 to W7 can be
reported as suspicious Trojan logic.
Fig. 1. HT detection comparison between transition probability and informa-
tion entropy.
This is because information entropy can gap the connectivity
between low transition probability and high transition proba-
bility, and it is more sensitive to low transition probability as
shown in Figure 2. It can be seen that the density-reachable
relationship between signal wires (from W1 to W7) is much
closer than the density-reachable relationship between low
transition probability and high transition probability.
Fig. 2. Distribution of information entropy for probability listed in Table 1.
It has been proven that the information entropy takes the
maximum value when p(transition) is equal to p(non −
transition). In other words, when p(transition) = p(non−
transition) = 0.5, the corresponding information entropy
can take the maximum value. The transition probability-
information entropy curve is as shown in Figure 3 according
to formula (1). Because the information entropy has the sym-
metry, the minimum value can be taken when p(transition)
= 0 or p(transition) = 1. Therefore, we should exclude the
noise data that has very low information entropy because of
much large p(transition).
Besides, the mutual information technology can measure the
correlations between primary inputs and internal signal wires,
which is beneficial to test patterns generation. Therefore, we
first propose applying the information theory technology in
the field of HT detection.
TABLE I
SIGNAL WIRES AND CORRESPONDING TRANSITION PROBABILITIES.
Wire W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14
Transition Probability 1
1000
1
800
1
500
1
200
1
100
1
80
1
50
1
20
1
10
1
8
1
5
3
10
1
2
6
10
Fig. 3. The transition probability-information entropy curve
B. The Application of Information Entropy
In order to apply the information entropy technology for
HT detection, we first use functional testing to generate digital
stimuli for the CUD. We believe that the set of test patterns
developed during design verification can satisfy this step. The
goal of this step is to perform functional tests for the CUD
with high coverage as much as possible. After the functional
tests, we can obtain the original waveform of each signal
wire in the CUD, which contain only binary values (0 or 1).
Our goal is to use the information entropy to evaluate the
controllability and observability of each logical region such
that we can effectively distinguish Trojan logic from the rest
of circuit.
However, we can not use the original waveform for HT
detection directly. For example, the transition of signal only
occurs once in OW1, while OW2 have five transitions of
signal as shown in Figure 4(a). Because the HT usually is
inserted in the logical regions with a low controllability and
low observability, which cause that the Trojan logic has a very
low transition probability. Hence, the logical region of OW1
should be more likely to be Trojan logic than OW2. However,
the information entropy of both OW1 and OW2 are 0.6931
according to formula (1) because the probability of 0 (0.5) and
1 (0.5) in OW1 is the same as in OW2.
Therefore, we should focus on the distribution of sig-
nal transitions rather than the distribution of 0 and 1 such
that we can use the information entropy to evaluate the
controllability and observability of each logical region. To
this end, we encode the original waveform according to the
following rules. We assume that the original waveform OW
= < s1, s2, ..., sn, sn+1 >. For each signal pair < si, si+1 >,
i = 1, 2, ..., n, if < si, si+1 > = < 0, 0 >, we encode si
as 0; if < si, si+1 > = < 0, 1 >, we encode si as 1; if
< si, si+1 > = < 1, 0 >, we encode si as 1; if < si, si+1 >
ow2=<0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,1,1>
ow1=<0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1>
(a) Original waveform OW1 and OW2.
Encode1=<0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0>
Encode2=<0,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0>
(b) Encoded waveform Encode1 and Encode2.
Fig. 4. Comparison between original waveform and encoded waveform.
= < 1, 1 >, we encode si as 0. The encoded waveform
corresponding to the original waveform of OW1 and OW2
are shown in the Figure 4(b). Then, we use formula (1) to
calculate the information entropy of each encoded waveform.
The information entropy of Encode1 (corresponding to OW1)
is approximately equal to 0.3488, and the information entropy
of Encode2 (corresponding to OW2) is approximately equal
to 0.6870, which is more in line with the results that we expect.
We apply the information entropy to distinguish differences
between Trojan logic and the normal circuit. Lots of experi-
ments demonstrate that the information entropy of each wire
is almost consistent with the controllability measure [32] of
this signal wire in the CUD. As shown in Figure 5, we can
obtain information entropy of each wire in the given circuit
after functional testing (106 cycles). It can be seen that the
information entropy at the output of the AND gate is 0.13820,
the information entropy at the input (top) of the AND gate is
0.22966 and the information entropy at the input ( bottom) of
the AND gate is 0.66271 due to different circuit structures.
0.69314
0.69314
0.69314 0.52385
0.66262
0.22966
0.66271
0.138200.69314
0.69314
0.69314
Fig. 5. Information entropy of each wire in the given circuit fragment.
C. HT Detection based Clustering
It’s worth noting that our circuit analysis focuses on the
state of internal wires in CUD rather than circuit structure. For
the sake of the convenience of discussion, we define CUD =
< PI,W,POUT >, where PI is the set of primary inputs,
W is the set of internal signal wires and POUT is the set
of primary outpus. More formally, PI = {pi1, pi2, ..., pil}, and
W = {w1, w2, ..., wm} and POUT = {pout1, pout2, ..., poutn}.
After functional testing, we encode each original waveform of
CUD and calculate the information entropy of each encoded
waveform. Once the above step is complete, we apply a typ-
ical density-based clustering algorithm called Density-Based
Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN)
to perform HT detection in the information entropy space
composed by W and POUT.
In the given data space, the density is defined as the number
of data points within a specified radius (r), and the core point
that has more than specified number of data points (MinPts)
within its r-neighborhood, and the border point that has fewer
than MinPts within its r-neighborhood but it is in the r-
neighborhood of a core point, and and any point that is not
a core point or border point is called noise point. Moreover,
date point q is directly density-reachable from another point
p, if p is a core point and q is within the r-neighborhood of
p. Data point q is density-reachable from another point p, if
there is a path of points p1(p) → p2 →...→ pn−1 → pn(q)
such that point pi+1 is directly density-reachable from point
pi. Data point p and data point q are density-connected if there
is a data point o such that both p and q are density-reachable
from o.
Algorithm 1 HT detection based clustering
Input: Information entropy space, r, MinPts
Output: Suspicious Trojan logics
1: repeat
2: Select an unvisited data point (P) from information
entropy space.
3: if P is core point then
4: mark P as visited data point, then find all points
which are density-reachable from P, and form a cluster.
5: end if
6: if P is border point then
7: mark P as visited data point, return 2
8: end if
9: if P is noise point then
10: delete P from information entropy space, return 2
11: end if
12: until all data points in information entropy space have
been visited
13: Report cluster with very low information entropy as
suspicious Trojan logics.
The basic idea of DBSCAN is to find the maximal sets
of density-connected points. That is, all points within the
cluster are mutually density-connected. Algorithm 1 shows the
clustering process in the information entropy space.
V. TEST PATTERN GENERATION FOR SUSPICIOUS TROJAN
LOGICS USING MUTUAL INFORMATION
In section 4, the proposed HT detection method can find
suspicious Trojan logics. This section introduces a heuris-
tic test pattern generation method using mutual information,
which can further increase the transitions of suspicious Trojan
logics. As is depicted in Figure 6, the correlation between each
suspicious Trojan logic and each primary input is measured by
mutual information. If the mutual information is greater than
the threshold, corresponding primary input is referred to as
strongly correlated primary input (SCPI) to this suspicious
Trojan logic. Therefore, each suspicious Trojan logic will
maintain a set of SCPI (SSCPI). Then, a heuristic algorithm is
developed to select minimum SCPIs but to cover all suspicious
Trojan logics.
Proposed HT 
detection method
Suspicious trojan 
logics
Primary inputs
The list of 
SSCPI 
Minimum SCPIs
correlation 
calculation
cluster
Fig. 6. Overview of test patterns generation method.
A. Feasibility Analysis
In the field of information theory, the mutual information
between X and Y can measure the mutual dependence between
the two variables. That is, mutual information can measure
the correlation between two variables [33]. If X and Y are
independent, their mutual information is zero. If X is a
deterministic function of Y (Y also is a deterministic function
of X), so knowing the value of X can determine the value of
Y and vice versa. In this case, the mutual information between
X and Y is the same as the H(X) and as the H(Y).
Natively, each circuit logic can be expressed as a Boolean
function of different primary inputs, which conforms statement
of the correlation. For example, we can obtain three Boolean
formula d = ab, e = c and f = ab + c for the given circuit
structure, as shown in Figure 7. Hence, we can know that
d and c, e and a, e and b, are independent such that their
mutual information must be zero, and e is a deterministic
function of c such that their mutual information is the same
as H(c) and H(e), and the mutual information I(d; a) should
be equal to the mutual information I(d; b) because of same
circuit logic. It is worth noting that the mutual information
I(f; a) is different from the mutual information I(f; c) because
of different circuit logic (AND gate and Inverter). In short, the
mutual information of two variables is higher, the correlation
of variables is stronger.
a
b
c
d
f
e
Fig. 7. The example of mutual information analysis for circuit logic.
B. Correlation Calculation using Mutual Information
We consider that the set of primary inputs PI =
{pi1, pi2, ..., pil}, and consider that the set of suspicious
Trojan logics (wires) SW = {sw1, sw2, ..., swt}, where t ≤
m+n. Firstly, we calculate mutual information I(swi; pij)
between each suspicious Trojan logic swi and each pri-
mary input pij , where i = 1, 2, ..., t and j = 1, 2, ..., l.
According to formula (7), I(swi; pij) = H(swi) + H(pij)
- H(pij , swi). Because each encoded waveform only con-
tains 0 (non-transition) and 1 (transition), H(pij ,swi) = -∑
pij∈{0,1}
∑
swi∈{0,1} p(pij , swi) logb p(pij , swi) according
to formula (3). If I(swi; pij) is greater than the threshold,
we refer to the primary input pij as the SCPI of suspicious
Trojan logic swi. For each swi, its threshold is equal to∑
pij∈PI
I(swi;pij)
l , where l is the number of primary inputs.
Finally, each suspicious trojan logic will have a SSCPI, and
the strong correlation between primary inputs and suspicious
trojan logics can constitute a strong correlation list as shown
in Table 2.
TABLE II
THE STRONG CORRELATION LIST: 1 INDICATES pij IS A SCPI OF swi AND
0 INDICATES NO
pi1 pi2 pi3 ... pil
sw1 1 0 1 ... 1
sw2 0 1 1 ... 1
... ... ... ... ... ...
swt 1 1 0 ... 1
C. Test Patterns Generation
Our goal is to select minimum number of SCPIs but to
cover all suspicious Trojan logics. We define that {pij} is set
of suspicious Trojan logics whose SSCPI includes pij , and
define ‘+’ operation between sets is equivalent to the ‘union’
operation between sets, and define ‘-’ operation between sets
is equivalent to the ‘difference’ operation between sets. For
example, {pi1} = {sw1, swt}, {pil} = {sw1, sw2, swt}, {pi1}
+ {pil} = {sw1, sw2, swt}, and {pil} - {pi1} = {sw2}.
Therefore, the problem can be abstracted as the following
formula, where xj ∈ {0, 1}. If pij is selected, xj = 1,
otherwise 0.
min
∑
pij∈PI
xj
s. t.
∑
pij∈PI
xj ∗ {pij} = SW
(8)
We develop a heuristic method to solve this problem. We
define f(k, y) indicates the optimal solution when PI =
{pi1, ..., pik} and SW = y. As shown in formula (9), it can
be seen that f(l, SW ) is the optimal solution of formula (8).
Algorithm 2 shows the core of solution. Then we perform
constrained-random simulation, setting all the primary input
at logic 0 or logic 1, which is not in SCPIs. For the rest of the
primary inputs in SCPIs, we still generate full-random stimuli
to perform simulation.
Algorithm 2 SCPI selection
Input: Strong correlation list
Output: SCPIs
1: function F(l, SW )
2: if pil ⊆ SW then
3: F (l, SW ) = min {F (l − 1, SW ), F (l − 1, SW − pil) + 1}
4: else
5: F (l, SW ) = F (l − 1, SW )
6: end if
7: end function
VI. EXPERIMENS AND EVALUATIONS
Proposed approach is evaluated on the different digital
circuit designs from TrustHub benchmark [34]. All circuits
are synthesized by Synopsys Design Compiler (DC) with
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation cell
library for 90-nm silicon-on-insulator process. All circuits are
simulated by Verilog Compiled Simulator (VCS) with high
coverage as much as possible. We conduct data processing
experiments and data analysis experiments on a computer with
2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 8GB memory [35]. Brief
information about the benchmarks used in our experiments is
provided in Table 3.
A. Clustering Comparison between Information Entropy
Space and Transition Probability Space
In our experiments, our method can detect all suspi-
cious Trojan logics in the CUD. Taking RS232 T1000 and
RS232 T1100 as examples, we present the difference of
clustering between information entropy space and transition
probability space. Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(b) shows the result
of clustering for RS232 T1000 benchmark and RS232 T1100
f(k, y) =
{
min {f(k − 1, y), f(k − 1, y − {pik}) + 1} if {pik} ⊆ y
f(k − 1, y) otherwise (9)
TABLE III
BRIEF INFORMATIONS OF CIRCUITS UNDER DETECTION
Circuit # units Features of HT
RS232 T1000 215 Trojan trigger is a combinational comparator; change functionality
RS232 T1100 217 Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
RS232 T1200 216 Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
RS232 T1300 213 Trojan trigger is a combinational comparator; change functionality
RS232 T1400 215 Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
RS232 T1500 216 Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
RS232 T1600 214 Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
s15850 T100 2182 Trojan trigger consists of two comparators and two flip-flops; leak an internal signal.
s35932 T200 5438 Trojan trigger is a comparator; denial of Service.
s38417 T100 5341 Trojan trigger is a comparator; change functionality, denial of service.
benchmark, respectively. It is worth noting that the clustering
process only focuses on the density-reachable relationship of
information entropy space.
(a) Clustering for RS232 T1000 benchmark.
(b) Clustering for RS232 T1100 benchmark.
Fig. 8. Clustering in information entropy space.
As shown in Figure 8, though the clustering algorithm
can divide the information entropy space into several cluters
(2 or 3), the circuit logics with extremely low information
entropy are always divided into one cluster according to
the density-reachable relationship. Similarly, we also use
transition probability for Trojan detection. Under the same
parameters, Figure 9(a) and Figure 9(b) shows the result of
clustering for RS232 T1000 and RS232 T1100, respectively.
It can be seen that transitions will result in high false
positives. However, the information entropy can effectively
(a) Clustering for RS232 T1000 benchmark.
(b) Clustering for RS232 T1100 benchmark.
Fig. 9. Clustering in transition probability space.
distinguish the difference between Trojan logics and normal
logics. In order to have a more intuitive insight on the
difference between information entropy and transition prob-
ability, we sort the information entropy space and transition
probability space of RS232 T1000 benchmark from lowest
to highest, respectively. Then the distribution of information
entropy and transition probability are shown in Figure 10. As
shown in Figure 10(a), the area with low information entropy
(red) and other area (green) have obvious density-unreachable
relationship. However, the area with low transition probability
and other area are still density-reachable (red) in transition
probability space shown in Figure 10(b), which will lead to
poor Trojan detection performance. Because the information
entropy can amplify the difference between low transition
probability and high transition probability, it can detect ef-
fectively suspicious Trojan logics.
(a) Sorted distribution of information entropy.
(b) Sorted distribution of transition probability.
Fig. 10. Difference between information entropy space and transition prob-
ability space for RS232 T1000 benchmark.
B. HT Detection Performance and Parameter Analysis
To further evaluate the effectiveness of HTDet, we manually
check the suspicious Trojan logics reported by the clustering
algorithm. The results are shown in Table 4. MinPts and r are
the parameters used in clustering process. The sensitivity of
the results is measured by the true positive rate (TPR), i.e.
the number of Trojan wires correctly detected as a percentage
of the total number of Trojan logics. We also provide the true
negative rage (TNR) results, which tells us the ratio of the true
negatives over the number of non-Trojan logics. False positive
rate (FPR = 1 - TNR) is the fraction of logics that are falsely
flagged as being suspicious Trojan logics. It can be seen that
HTDet can effectively detect Trojan logics of CUD with the
extremely low false positives.
We also analyze the effect of parameters MinPts and r
on HT detection performance using control variable method.
When r is fixed to 0.05, both TPR and TNR decline as
MinPts increases, as shown in Figure 11(a). This is because
the number of noise point gradually increases when MinPts
increases. Similarly, when MinPts is fixed to 5 and r increases,
TPR gradually decline but TNR almost is constant, as shown
in Figure 11(b). This is because all data points are clustered
into normal logcis when r is equal to 0.06 or 0.07. Hence, the
appropriate values of parameters are also necessary for Trojan
detection.
TABLE IV
RESULTS OF MANUAL CHECK
Circuit MinPts r TPR TNR
RS232 T1000 2 0.05 62% 99%
RS232 T1100 5 0.04 67% 99%
RS232 T1200 5 0.04 89% 99%
RS232 T1300 2 0.05 89% 99%
RS232 T1400 5 0.04 61% 99%
RS232 T1500 5 0.04 73% 99%
RS232 T1600 5 0.04 62% 99%
s15850 T100 4 0.05 96% 99%
s35932 T200 5 0.05 93% 99%
s38417 T100 4 0.05 100% 99%
(a) The effect of MinPts on TPR and TNR.
(b) The effect of r on TPR and TNR.
Fig. 11. Parameter Analysis on RS232 T1000 benchmark.
C. Comparison to existing methods
we compare the experimental results to existing methods
in the point of TPR and TNR. Reference [16] proposed a
HT detection method based on static structure analysis, and
Reference [23] proposed a HT detection method based on
signal correlations. Table 5 shows the comparison to [16],
and Table 6 shows the comparison to [23]. Obviously, our
approach can obtain better HT detection performance in order
to achieve the good trade-off between TPR and TNR. In the
point of average TNR, it can obtain the 99% average TNR
value, which indicates that proposed technique, HTDet, can
significantly reduce false positives.
TABLE V
COMPARISON TO THE EXISTING METHOD [16]
TPR TNR
Circuit [16] Ours [16] Ours
RS232 T1000 53% 62% 31% 99%
RS232 T1100 58% 67% 27% 99%
RS232 T1200 80% 89% 26% 99%
RS232 T1300 89% 89% 26% 99%
RS232 T1400 83% 61% 22% 99%
RS232 T1500 83% 73% 24% 99%
RS232 T1600 89% 62% 26% 99%
s15850 T100 93% 96% 66% 99%
s35932 T200 100% 93% 59% 99%
s38417 T100 100% 100% 76% 99%
Average 83% 79% 39% 99%
TABLE VI
COMPARISON TO THE EXISTING METHOD [23]
TPR TNR
Circuit [23] Ours [23] Ours
s15850 T100 61% 96% 99% 99%
s35932 T200 27% 93% 99% 99%
s38417 T100 100% 100% 99% 99%
Average 63% 96% 99% 99%
In this paper, we do not attempt to find all Trojan logics
(wires), but try the best to find a set of most suspicious logics,
which can effectively reduce the authentication time. That is,
a manual check after the automatic HT detection is always
necessary.
D. Effectiveness Analysis of Test Patterns Generation Method
We randomly selected three benchmarks (RS232 T1000,
RS232 T1100 and s15850 T100) to evaluate the effectiveness
of proposed test patterns generation method. Let the transition
of each suspicious logic swi be tri during the simulation,
where swi ∈ SW , and i = 1, 2, ..., t. Let trmax be
the maximum of tri. Let trave be equal to
∑t
i=1 tri
t . Then,
maximum transition and average transition are used to measure
the effectiveness of test patterns. After obtaining SCPIs, we set
that all the primary inputs, which are not in SCPIs, at logic 0
or logic 1. For the primary inputs in SCPIs, we still generate
full-random stimuli to perform simulation. After 106 cycles
of simulation, the transitions of suspicious Trojan logics are
summarized in Table 7.
It can be seen that proposed test patterns generation method
can increase effectively the maximum transition and average
transition of these suspicious logics, which means that it can
reduce activation time.
VII. RELATED WORKS
HT detection is a challenging problem. Lots of researches
on HT detection have been proposed in the past decades, which
can be roughly classified into reverse engineering, side channel
analysis, static structure analysis, statistical feature analysis
and functional testing.
TABLE VII
TRANSITIONS COMPARISON: BEFORE * INDICATES FULL-RANDOM TEST
STIMULI, AND AFTER * INDICATES CONSTRAINED-RANDOM TEST
STIMULI USING OUR APPROACH
Circuit trmax trave
Before RS232 T1000 722 224.67
After RS232 T1000 768 230.89
Before RS232 T1100 719 224.39
After RS232 T1100 746 231.56
Before s15850 T100 716 64.19
After s15850 T100 954 96.48
Bao proposed that using reverse engineering to dissect
the chip under detection can guarantee that any malicious
modifications in chip can be detected [5], [6]. However, the
limitation of this method is that the time cost is too much, it
even takes several weeks to analyze the chip under detection.
Hence, the reverse engineering can only be applied to the IC
with small scale and simple structure.
In side channel analysis [7]–[13], the impacts of HTs
(e.g., circuit delay, transient current, leakage power and heat
analysis) are used to detect whether there are the HTs in CUD.
However, the characteristics of circuit is more susceptible to
process variations and environmental noise due to the present
nanoscale technologies [14].
A score-based classification method is proposed for iden-
tifying HTs in CUD [15]. This technique comprehensively
analyzes the characteristics of Trojan logics introduced at
TrustHub [34], then uses a strategy of conditional judgment for
HT detection. Hasegawa proposed learning structure features
for Trojan detection [16]–[18]. For this purpose, support
vector machine, multi-layer neural network and random forest
is applied to learn circuit structure features, respectively.
Reference [19] summarized the triggering characteristics of
Trojan circuits and proposed a feature analysis technique based
on flip-flop level information flow graph. Then, a multilevel
HT detection framework is proposed [20], which combines
flip-flop level and combinational logic level structure feature
analysis.
Reference [21] analyzes time to generate a transition in
functional Trojans. Transition is modeled by geometric distri-
bution and the number of clock cycles required to generate a
transition is estimated. FANCI [22] considers that the input-to-
output dependency has significant difference between Trojan
logic and normal logic, so it flags logics which have weak
input-to-output dependency as suspicious Trojan logics by
Boolean function analysis. In [23], a HT detection method
using signal correlation has been proposed. It basically es-
timates the statistical correlation between signals in a circuit
for Trojan detection with the use of ordering points to identify
the clustering structure algorithm. Furthermore, [24] proposed
a reference-free HT detection scheme based on controllability
and observability. This paper indicates that the characteristics
of controllability and observability between Trojan gates and
genuine gates have significant difference. In [25], a novel HT
detection approach through distinguishing the “unnaturalness”
of HT from the “naturalness” of normal circuits by applying
natural language processing technology. This paper considers
that design teams of commercial chips will have the spe-
cific design style due to the existence of established design
specifications, so the statistical method can be used to detect
abnormal circuit logics.
Functional testing-based HT detection approaches [26]–[29]
try to generate random test patterns to activate the HTs in
CUD. If the logical values of primary outputs do not match
the correct results, a Trojan is detected. The primary challenge
of functional testing-based method is that the Trojan circuit is
much smaller than the original circuit, and HTs usually have
the dormant nature. Hence, it is difficult to detect potential
HTs in CUD by traditional functional testing.
Different from traditional functional verification approaches,
we propose HTDet, a novel HT detection technique based on
information entropy. We consider that the Trojan usually be
inserted in the regions with low controllability and low observ-
ability in order to maintain high concealment, which will result
in that Trojan logics appear extremely low transitions during
the simulation. Our approach does not require that the Trojan
logic is pushed the triggering state. As long as the transitions
of circuit logics are extremely low, HTDet can flag them as
suspicious Trojan logics using density-reachable relationship.
Although the information theory has been applied in many
fields, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
to use the information theory technology to detect HTs in
hardware design.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel HT detection method
named HTDet, which can distinguish effectively the transitions
difference betwwen normal logics and Trojan logics using
information entropy technique. HTDet is an unsupervised
learning method and can find quickly suspicious Trojan logics
without the requirement on the “Golden Circuit”. HTDet does
not require that the Trojan logic is pushed the activation state
during the simulation, and it flags circuit logics with extremely
low information entropy as suspicious Trojan logics. Besides,
we develop a heuristic method to increase transitions of sus-
picious Trojan logics using mutual information. Experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of HTDet.
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